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GOVERNABILITY, PARTICIPATION AND 
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING 
Yehezkel Dror V 
SUMMARY OF PROPOSITIONS 
Proposition One: Planning is a main facet of the "capacity to 
govern", the term "governability" being misleading 
in many respects, 
Proposition Two: Improvement of planning must take place within 
upgrading of the Central Mind of Government as a 
whole, in a "selective-radicalims" retrofitting-of-
the state strategy. 
Proposition Three: Much attention and efforts should be allocated to 
upgrading policy elites, including politicians. 
Proposition Four: National Policy Colleges should be set up, as an 
integral part of planning upgrading efforts. 
Proposition Five: Planning must be integrated into current decision-
making, up to crisis decision-making. 
Proposition Six: Planning must be detached from "current heat", at 
least in part. 
Proposition Seven: To cope with the antinomy posed by propositions 
five and six, a set of "planning" units is essen-
tial, ranging from advisory units to rulers to 
Think Tanks. These units should constitute a 
network and an informal college. 
*/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsibility 
of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those 





At the core of planning a central "island of 
excellence", with special features, is essential. 
The main task of central planning, and especially 
its core unit, is design and evaluation of grand-
strategies for development. 
Innovativeness and "policy-gambling" illus 
trate essential planning qualifications. 
Proposition Eleven: Planning professionals need much upgrading. 
Proposition Twelve: A quasi-corporative approach, with main 
economic social bodies participating in the 
planning process, is often preferable. But 




Detailed planning and its implementation 
should be devolved, up to "grass-root" 
initiative encouragement and autonomy. 
Tendencies to take over the market or trust it 
too much, with some oscillation between 
extremes, should be avo^^pfi• 
Implementation of main "break-through" 
projects needs special consecrated organi-
zations . 
Proposition Sixteen: Building up public identification with the 
development strategies is a must. This 
involves (a) realistic visions; and (b) public 
enlightenment. 
Proposition Seventeen: Social policies constitute an essential 
element of planning, both as a goal and as an 
- instruments. 
Proposition Eighteen: Political stability and containment of social 
violence are essential. This returns us to 
the necessity to take up planning improvement 
within a broad context of building up capa-
cities to govern. 
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Preface 
1. To facilitate its functions to stimulate discussion, this paper 
must be sharp and short. But this carries the dangers of surface-
analysis, if not superficiality, in respect to a complex and serious 
set of issues in urgent need of deep analysis. The scarcity of 
literature adequately handling the problems of planning in mixed market 
economies under present and expectable Latin American and Caribbean 
conditions aggravates the danger of surface-analysis and of possible 
fixation on manifest symptoms and painful phenomena, instead of basic 
factors. 
2. To try and reduce this danger without transgressing beyond the 
limits of a discussion paper, the following strategy is adopted: 
a) This discussion paper is kept succinct, short and sharp, with 
eighteen main propositions being presented and briefly explained. A 
few references to relevant literature are provided when points beyond 
usual planning literature are taken up. 
b) Three appendixes supplement the paper, provide some context 
and develop some of its underlying ideas, together with select refer-
ences to salient literature (for a fuller treatment of some relevant 
theories and empiric findings, as well as proposals, see my book 
Policy-making Under Adversity, [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1986]). 
3. This paper is based on a mix of theoretic work and involvement in 
planning and its improvement in various countries, including some Latin 
American ones. Some of its underlying findings and ideas are developed 
in Appendix One: "National Planning for Development: Diagnosis and 
Prescription". 
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Eighteen Main Propositions 
Proposition One: Planning is a main facet of the "capacity to 
govern", the term "governability" being 
misleading in many respects. 
4. The term "governability", while quite fashionable, is very 
misleading in many respects. It implies that present difficulties of 
governments result from societies and problems having become "un-
governable", with the consequent hint that it is up to societies and 
other facets of reality to become "governable". While it is true that 
many societal and other features pose serious challenges to govern-
ments, the variable which should be taken up is the "capacity to 
govern", which may include efforts to make society more governable, but 
puts the onus where it belongs. It is up to governments to upgrade 
themselves and to develop capacities which enable them to fulfill their 
tasks under more demanding conditions. 
5. "Planning" is a raultisensc term. But, however defined for 
different purposes and in various worlds of discourse, "planning" 
implies longer-range views, interrelated sets of decisions and actions, 
and a high quality of professional reasoning. It should be added that 
the idea of planning is not wedged to dirigisme, different mixes of 
state and market roles serving themselves as options for "planning" and 
permitting, and often requiring, various forms and modes of planning. 
6. Correctly understood, various forms and modes of planning cons-
titute and important dimension of the capacity to govern. This is all 
the more so the case when the tasks faced by society require sustained 
and long-range efforts, as is the case with development ambitions. In 
respect to development, and the roles of the state in it, planning is 
essential, inter alia, to counterbalance political propensities to 
prefer short-term views. Similarly the professional reasoning elements 
of planning are important for supplying adecuate elements of "develop-
ment rationality". Therefore, one of the recommended "frames" for 
considering planning within the context of the colloquium is planning 
as an essential dimension of capacities to govern in general and of 
"development capacities" in the face of adverse conditions, in par-
ticular. 
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Proposition Two: Improvement of planning must take place within 
upgrading of the Central Mind of Government as 
a whole, in a "selective-radicalism" retrofit-
ting of-the state strategy. 
7. Especially pertinent for planning is the metaphoric concept of 
"Central Mind of Government", which covers the main central govern-
mental decision-making cluster. To be effective, planning must 
influence main decision-making and decision implementation processes. 
Such influence on decision-making can take a variety of forms, ranging 
from educating top decision-makers as well as policy publics in general 
and reshaping their cognitive maps and attribution theories, to direct 
transformation of planning recommendations into authoritative "command 
decisions". But all forms of influence by planning depend on inter-
action with main decision-making and decision—implementation centers 
and staffs. Therefore, planning must be viewed within the policy-
making and policy-implementing systems as a whole, upgrading of the 
utility of planning depending inter alia on suitable changes in other 
systems components and the systems as a whole, in ways making them more 
receptive to planning inputs. 
8. Hence, the proposition that improvement of planning should take 
place within improvement of the Central Mind of Government as a whole. 
It follows, that issues of planning upgrading must be considered 
within broader issues of retrofitting governance in general and 
retrofitting of central policymaking and policy-implementing systems in 
particular, otherwise the difficulties subsumed under the term "un-
governability" cannot be coped with. 
9. Relevant is the idea of a selective-radical reform strategy, which 
goes beyond incremental improvements, which usually are quite worth-
less, and rejects presumptions to transform all of the machinery of 
government, which is usually impossible and often unnecessary. 
Instead, a selective-radical reform strategy focuses on radical 
improvement of a small number of critical components, with a number of 
such improvements being combined in a modular cluster, so as to achieve 
significant impact on the performance of the system as a whole with the 
help of a limited, and therefore more feasible, reform set. 
10. The selective-radicalism reform strategy relates to upgrading of 
planning in two main ways: First, if our starting point would be the 
upgrading o£ Central Minds of Governments, this route also brings us to 
the necessity to improve planning, because planning is an essential 
mode of policymaking aiming at development, as already indicated. 
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This is important because it justifies efforts to improve planning not 
only from an internal view of planning, which axiomatically regards it 
as important, but also from an external view of planning, which 
allocates to it importance because of essential functions fulfilled by 
in within the capacity to develop as a whole. 
11. Second, the selective-radicalism reform strategy poses the 
question what is the minimum set of interdependent improvements which 
are essential for upgrading planning. As indicated above, improving 
planning by itself may be useless and even counterproductive unless the 
Central Mind of Government is willing and able to utilize correctly 
planning inputs. Therefore, some concomitant changes in other com-
ponents of the Central Mind of Government are essential, in addition to 
upgradings the planning activity itself. But, changes related to 
upgrading of planning in other dimensions of Central Minds of Govern-
ments should be kept to an essential minimum when the postulated 
mission is to improve planning, so as to keep the task feasible. 
Í2. within such an appiuacli, a number of components of Central Mind 
of Government must be upgraded to improve planning. These include, for 
instance, qualification of political decision-makers, modes of deci-
sion-making management, policy analysis units to top decision-makers 
and more, up to interfaces between planning and crisis management. The 
following propositions elaborate some such needs, which are integral to 
upgrading planning within the perspectives of capacity to govern and 
capacity to engage in accelerated development. 
13. Going beyond the scope of this discussion paper are broader issues 
of planning and capacity to govern, which often are critical. Elemen-
tary needs of political stability and containment of'social violence 
are taken up in the concluding proposition eighteen; and some relevant 
issues are discussed in other of the propositions. But, useful 
planning depends on some essential aspects of the capacity to govern 
which go beyond this paper, such as adequate governmental power and a 
lot of societal consensus. Satisfying such requisites must receive 
priority over upgrading of planning, otherwise the latter is irre-
levant. Accordingly, in a number of countries upgrading of planning 
should be taken up within a broader approach to "reform of the state" 
and the latter should receive priority. 
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Proposition Three: Much attention and efforts should be allocated 
to upgrading policy elites, including politi-
cians. 
14. The interrelations between improvement of planning and upgrading 
policy elites, including politicians, poses crucial issues. These are 
hard to deal with because of their unconventional nature and the taboos 
surrounding them. To put the matter briefly: a main way for planning 
to exert influence is to fulfill didactic functions in respect to 
policy elites, including politicians on one extreme and the public at 
large on the other. More difficult, in order for planning to affect 
reality for the better, policy elites, including top level politicians, 
must be "planning-friendly" in their policy behavior (as distinct from 
symbolic declarations) and at least somewhat "planning-sophisticated" 
in their intellectual equipment. 
15. Therefore, planning should regard "education" of policy elites, 
and especially top decision-makers, as one of its main tasks. This has 
many of operational implications, such as the need for "planning 
briefing rooms" which can present complex issues and multiple options 
in ways comprehensible to politicians and indirectly "educating" them. 
16. A different and more demanding conclusion is, that inventions are 
needed on upgrading the qualifications of policy elites. This is 
important and unconventional a requirement, which needs operationa-
lization to clarify its implications and feasibility. Accordingly, the 
next proposition presents a concrete proposal to set up National Policy 
Colleges. Let me add that there is no contradiction whatsoever between 
correct democratic theory and efforts to upgrade the quality of policy 
elites, including politicians. Indeed, in many developing countries 
intensive efforts to try to improve policy elites are essential, 
starting with modes of motivation of bright young persons to move into 
politics and policy-related activities, up to adjustments of electoral 
procedures to improve the quality of successful candidates. Within the 
limited scope of this colloquium, I limit my proposal to National 
Policy Colleges, which are particularly pertinent to planning and 
relatively more feasible and faster in producing results than other 
approaches. But needs for a broader approach to upgrading policy 
elites as essential for development should be kept in mind. 
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Proposition Four: National Policy Colleges should be set up, as 
an integral part of planning upgrading 
efforts. 
17. The idea of National Policy Colleges is simple, though implemen-
tation is difficult. Selected groups of various policy-makers and 
policy-influencers should spend together a period of four to six weeks 
working, full time, on deep analysis of major national policy issues, 
with professional inputs to be provided by experts. Participants 
should include a mixture of politicians, civil servants, planners and 
other policy professionals, military officers, trade union and employer 
organization leaders, intellectuals, massmedia commentators, etc. 
Products of the proposed National Policy College include upgrading of 
knowledge of participants, as well as better consensus. 
18. The subjects to be dealt with at the National Policy College 
overlap main planning concerns; and methods to be presented at the 
National Policy College overlap advanced planning methodology. Also, 
conclusions from projects at the National Policy College can serve as 
inputs into planning. 
19. Details of structure, staffing, location and contents of National 
Policy Colleges depend on particular country situations. But, in 
principle, I regard National Policy Colleges as essential in many 
countries for building up the political culture infrastructure essen-
tial for planning, as well as for high-quality policy-making and 
capacities to govern in general. 
Proposition Five: Planning must be integrated into current 
decision-making, up to crisis decision-making. 
20. Unless planning is integrated into current decision-making, its 
content may become "reality-distance" and its impacts on governmental 
behavior may approximate zero. This is well illustrated in the 
extreme situation of crisis decision-making. In quite a number of 
countries important decisions will be taken under conditions approxi-
mating crisis decision-making, such as economic and debt-handling 
crises. Unless planning provides a compass for such crisis decision-
making it (a) does not fulfill its essential role as an important aid 
to decision-making; and (b) its impact on reality is much reduced. 
Therefore, planning inter alia must be integrated into crisis decision-
making. This can be done in various ways, such as pre-allocation of 
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appropriate roles to top planning officials in crisis staffs; parti-
cipation of planning officials in designing and running-in crisis 
decision-making systems; preparation of contingency plans for crisis 
scenarios in the planning units and with their participation; and 
more. But, first, the principle that planning must help in crisis 
decision-making and influence it needs recognition. 
21. Crisis decision-making is an important but special case of inte-
gration of planning into crisis decision-making. More regular modes of 
inputting planning into policymaking require opportunities for planning 
to comment on important decisions on the agenda of governments and top 
decision-makers; interlocking of the budgeting process with the 
planning process, without loosing the distinct nature of each one of 
them; suitable procedures for considering planning recommendations on 
the top level; etc. Details need fitting to particular circumstances, 
but in principle institutionalized modes for integrating planning into 
current decision-making are a must. Good informal interlocking is also 
desirable and often essential, but inadequate by itself. 
Proposition Six: Planning must be detached from "current heat", 
at least in part. 
22. Three of the basic causes of main policy-reasoning weaknesses are 
(a) ignorance in respect to relevant facts and knowledge; (b) inherent 
difficulties of reasoning on complex situations involving much incer-
tainty, value conflict, multiple variables, etc.; and (c) "motivated 
irrationality", that is the impact of strong emotions, hopes, feelings, 
ideologies and similar "hot" variables on reasoning. (See David Pears, 
Motivated Irrationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; the 
matter is discussed at greater length in Yehezkel Dror, "Notes Towards 
a Philosophy of Policy-Reasoning", in work). 
23. One of the main functions of planning is to counteract and 
overcome such prevalent weaknesses of policy-making. In particular, 
planning should be "cold", in the sense of detached handling of issues, 
however emotionally imposing, even while being strongly committed to 
national goals and development. To meet this requirements, at least 
some of planning must be detached from the "heat" characterizing 
Central Minds of Governments and corridors of powers. 
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Proposition Seven: To cope with the antinomy posed by propo-
sitions five and six, a set of "planning" 
units is essential, ranging from advisory 
units to rulers to Think Tanks. These units 
should constitute a network and an informal 
college. 
24. Putting propositions six and seven together, planning must meet 
contradictory demands: it must be well integrated into the Central Mind 
of Government and share the heat of corridors of powers, system, while 
also "jumping out of the system". These antinomies cannot be coped 
with satisfactorily within any one unit and process. Therefore, 
"planning" must be divided between a range of units, each one of which 
has a double mission, which add up to an aggregated planning activity 
providing a good mix of contradictory processes. Therefore, a "plan-
ning cluster" rather than a single "planning center" is needed. 
25. To illustrate the range of components of the needed planning 
cluster, let me discuss briefly two of its main elements which contrast 
in many teatures, but are both essential and complement one another: On 
one extreme "planning" requires high-quality advisory units to rulers; 
on the other extreme, "planning" requires detached policy R&D organi-
zations of the "Think Tank" type. Also needed are various in-between 
entities, such as planning units in main ministries. But the advisory 
units to rulers on one extreme and the Think Tanks on the other, do 
serve to illustrate the multiple elements essential for a well-
performing planning cluster. 
26. A variety of planning units can be integrated within a central 
Ministry of Planning. But more is needed, even if a Ministry of 
Planning can serve as the center of the planning cluster. To achieve 
coherence, the various planning units and planning professionals should 
constitute a network and an informal college, in addition to various 
formal coordination and integration procedures and structures. 
Proposition Eight: At the core of planning a central "island of 
excellence", with special features, is 
essential. 
27. The planning cluster needs a core which constitutes an "island of 
excellence" and which serves as the central "Planning Brain". When a 
distinct Planing Ministry exist, the core planning unit should be 
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located in it; but it is not identical with the ministry as a whole, 
which engages usually also in many other necessary activities, such as 
detailed project programming and evaluation. 
28. To meet the needs of planning for development, such as methodo-
logical sophistication and multi-disciplinary knowledge and perspec-
tives, as discussed in some of the following propositions, the core 
planning "island of excellence" must be of top quality and of really 
interdisciplinary a composition. Its own planning processes need 
constant monitoring and improvement. The quality of the core planning 
central "island of excellence" is critical in determining the quality 
and utility of the planning process as a whole and needs, therefore, 
much attention. This is all the more true in view of the empiric 
finding by the author that existing planning ministries usually do not 
meet requirements of a core central planning "island of excellence". 
Proposition Nine: The main task of central planning, and 
especially its core unit, is design and 
evaluation of grand-strategies for deve-
lopment . 
29. Many planning activities engage in efforts to optimize what are 
sinking curves, while what is often needed are novel development 
grand-strategies which can mutate present declining trends and break-
out of decaying situations. Therefore, the main task of central 
planning is design and evaluation of grand-strategies for development. 
30. The substantive contents of development grand-strategies are 
outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, let me at least 
illustrate some of their facets, which need handling and innovative 
design by central planning: 
* The proper role of free markets and their limitations; 
* Shock strategies versus balanced development approaches; 
* National large projects, yes or no and what; 
* Sectoral priorities and its instruments; 
* External economic relations and debt—managing strategies; 
* Employment and social policies and their relation to economic 
policies, as further discussed later on; 
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* Long-range infrastructure policies; 
* Cultural aspects of "development", "productivity", etc., as 
further mentioned later on; 
* Innovation encouragement policies; 
* Regional markets and other forms of multi-national co-
operation. 
31. Experiences in Japan, in the New Industrial Nations, in France and 
more show that design of suitable development grand-strategies, in 
principle, is not impossible. But the challenge is very demanding. 
Therefore planning, as a main mode for successfully handling the 
development challenge, must be of very high quality, or it may do much 
more harm than good. Especially, when trends are on declining curves, 
as they are now —planning must concentrate on trend-mutating break-
through development grand-strategies, and not incremental impro-
visation. This most difficult assignment, involving as it sometimes 
does intervention with negative deep processes, up to "throwing 
surprises at history", reinforces the requirement for outstanding 
core-planning "islands of excellence", as already presented. 
Proposition Ten: Innovativeness and "policy-gambling" illus-
trate essential planning qualifications. 
32. The need for outstanding quality of planning as a condition of its 
usefulness for development can be further illustrated by two re-
quirements, namely innovativeness and "policy—gambling". 
33. Applying a modern philosophy-of-knowledge approach (see, for 
instance, Peter Munz, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper 
or Wittgenstein?, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, esp. ch. 6), 
two different phases of development policy-making can be distinguished: 
(a) invention of new options; and (b) screening of the options and 
their "confirmation" or "refutation" by reality. The present situation 
of many developing countries, including in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, requires first of all invention and design of new develop-
ment grand-strategic options, all known ones being of doubtful use-
fulness at best. Therefore, "innovativeness" must be a main feature of 
adequate planning. But this is a hard requirement going beyond 
conventional professional knowledge and depending on unusual persons 
and innovation-encouraging organizational climates and social 
conditions. 
1 3 
34. Different, but not less demanding, is the "policy-gambling" aspect 
of planning. Because of environmental turbulance and ultra-change 
(that is, change in the patterns of change itself), planning must cope 
with much uncertainty, including both "hard" uncertainty which is 
inherent in the processes and therefore cannot be reduced, and "far-
going" uncertainty, on the very shape of possible futures and not only 
their probabilities. Consequently, all decisions are in essence in 
part "fuzzy gambles" and planning is largely a policy-gambling and 
policy-gambling-aiding activity. This view of planning has fargoing 
implications for its methods, its relations with politicians, its 
educational functions and its very nature. Therefore, this matter is 
further detailed in Appendix Two: "Planning as Fuzzy Gambling: A 
Radical Perspective on Coping with Uncertainty" (as well as in Addendum 
B of Appendix Three). 
Proposition Eleven: Planning professionals need much upgrading. 
35. The requirements for innovativeness and the view of planning as 
policy-gambling are but two illustrations out of many of required 
retooling of planning professionals. Despite some pioneering efforts, 
also in Latin America (e.g., the experimental program of the Escuela de 
Ciencias y T§cnicas de Gobierno in Caracas), present training of 
planners does not prepare them adequately for their real tasks lacking 
essential knowledge and methods. Therefore, upgrading the knowledge 
and revising "professional reflection-in-action" (see Donald A. Schon, 
The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action, New 
York: Basic Books, 1983) of planners are essential, together with 
adjustment in expectations from planning by main policymakers and 
relevant publics. 
36. In the longer run, novel Public Policy and Planning Schools are 
essential, perhaps on a regional basis. But, to provide urgently 
required knowledge and skills, crash-programs are needed which rapidly 
retool available professionals and provide some insights to main 
policy-makers. A modular approach of intense training by sets of 
workshops with in-between active learning may provide a solution which 
rapidly upgrades planners in feasible a way. Because of the practical 
importance of meeting this need, some modes for doing so based on 
actual experiences, in part within UN and UNDP projects, are detailed 
in Appendix Three: "Advanced Workshops and Training in Planning and 
Policy Analysis: Lessons from Experience". 
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Proposition Twelve: A quasi-corporative approach, with main 
economic-social bodies participating in the 
planning process, is often preferable. But 
central decision-authority must be preserved. 
37. Moving on from "capacity to govern" and related planning issues to 
"participation", the inadequacies of any "command" approach need 
recognition. Without disparaging the importance and often essentiality 
of state guidance in many developing countries, still once quite 
primitive conditions are overcome and autonomous social and economic 
institutions do exist, a co-operative approach involving all main 
actors is essential for development planning that is to have positive 
effects on reality. 
38. Therefore, some variation of quasi-corporative an approach is 
recommended. Quite a number of illuminating models are available, such 
as in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, the East-Asian New 
Industrial Nations, and also in a different form some projects in the 
USA. The quasi-corporative structure must be fitten to the parti-
cularities of each country- But, as a minimum, it should include an 
integrating mechanism covering main social and economic actors on the 
political level; and a professional network of planning and similar 
units in main social and economic organizations on the operational 
level. 
39. But care must be taken for government not to become a captive of 
social and economic interests, which often are inertia-prone (relevant, 
with suitable adjustments to Latin American and Caribbean conditions, 
is Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nation: Economic Growth, 
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven, Co: Yale University 
Press, 1982). Reliance on market processes together with corporate 
arrangements must be balanced by preserving and upgrading the autonomy 
of the state, including its planning process. This subject requires 
separate consideration, but should be kept in mind when various forms 
of "participation" and their expansion are considered. 
Proposition Thirteen: Detailed planning and its implementation 
should be devolved, up to "grass-root" 
initiative encouragement and autonomy. 
40. To upgrade "participation", while also reducing overloads on 
central planning and assuring a better fit with local conditions, 
detailed planning and its implementation should be devolved to regional 
and local units, subjects to safeguards against exaggerated "localism" 
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and decay of essential central controls. Proliferation of inno-
vativeness also requires encouragement of grass-root entrepreneurship. 
These principles also well fit and supplement a mixed market-government 
development strategy, in which many functions are left to a semi-
autonomous market. 
41. To move in such directions, a number of steps are essential beyond 
formal decisions and symbolic declarations. In particular, required 
are: 
(a) Actual transfer of power and resources to autonomous actors; 
(b) Readiness to tolerate and even encourage risk-taking and 
mistakes, as long as some "red lines" are preserved; 
(c) Determined action to cut intervention-capacities of central 
units, otherwise they will hinder local initiatives, never 
mind formal policies. 
42. Implementation of such a meta—planning (i.e., planning of 
planning) policy is difficult, as interestingly illustrated under the 
different, but still relevant, conditions of the People^s Republic of 
China. A strong political will is essential to actually move in the 
direction of planning devolution. 
Proposition Fourteen: Tendencies to take over the market or trust it 
too much, with some oscillation between 
extremes, should be avoided. 
43. , In continuation of proposition thirteen, the need for persistent a 
policy on the role of the market needs underlining, all the more so 
because of tendencies to swing between reducing the role of the market 
and intervening in its details on one hand and elimination of needed 
controls on the other hand, as a result of various pressures, short-
range considerations and also panic-decision-making. Predictability 
and some stability are essential prerequisites of adequate market oper-
ations. This all the more makes essential a persistent policy on the 
roles of the market. Possible prejudices of planners in either of the 
extreme directions must be counteracted and any change in market roles 
be very carefully evaluated before approval. 
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Proposition Fifteen: Implementation of main "break-through" 
projects needs special consecrated 
organizations. 
44. To balance reliance on participation and on market processes, it 
is necessary to take into account that main development projects and 
grand-strategies may require direct governmental action. Such action 
often cannot be left to existing bureaucratic structures, which may be 
quite unable to carry out innovative and large-scale development 
activities and projects. 
45. Reform of public bureaucracies as a whole is at best a very slow 
process and often a hopeless one under real conditions. Therefore, 
setting up of "consecrated" organizations, with a strong value-
committment to novel development policies and projects is often 
essential for implementation of innovative plans. Such implementation 
tools should be carefully considered within the planning process 
itself. 
Proposition Sixteen: Building up public identification with the 
development strategies is a must. This 
involves (a) realistic visions; and (b) public 
enlightenment. 
46. In addition to semi-corporative cooperation with main social and 
economic institutions, mass-participation is essential for effective 
development. Unavoidable interim costs of necessary "constructive-
destruction" make mobilization of mass-support all the more essential 
in many Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
47. The requirements for "mass-participation" leads from planning into 
politics and raises the need for "sould-craft" and "visionary leader-
ship" as essential for success in ambitious development endeavours. 
These go beyond the scope of this paper, but should be recognized as 
essential a political basis for effective planning and deserve separate 
consideration. 
48. Within the narrover perspectives of planning, still some thing can 
be done: it should be recognized that planning should provide "real-
istic visions" and that planning should engage in enlightening acti-
vities directed at mobilizing broad support. The activities of the New 
Zeland Planning Council illustrate some possibilities for "planning" to 
serve public policy enlightenment. 
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Proposition Seventeen: Social policies constitute an essential 
element of planning, both as a goal and 
as an instrument. 
49. Social policies, in a broad and comprehensive meaning of that 
term, must be included within development planning, because of at least 
three types of reasons: 
(a) Value-wise, development aims ultimately at providing a "good 
society" and satisfying human individual and collective needs. 
Therefore, broad social aims should serve as a compass for much of 
development planning. 
(b) "Development" depends a lot on societal factors, including 
possible cultural prerequisites of technological modernization, 
(compare Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the 
Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980 with Leon Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964, and 
with Michio Morishima, Why Japan ^Succeeded"?: Western Technology and 
the Japanese Ethos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. I 
recommend urgently a colloquium considering such a "cultural requisite" 
approach to development in the Latin American and Caribbean context. 
This, in addition to complex individual aspects of "modernity"; e.g., 
see Alex Inkeles, ed., Exploring Individual Modernity, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983). 
(c) Tactically, visible "social justice" and equitable sharing of 
development burdens are essential for mobilizing support, in addition 
to their inherent value justification. 
50. Additional social requirements of development include human 
capital production, propensities to learn and to invest, and more. 
Taken together, the various considerations make social policy and 
integral and central dimension of planning for development. This, in 
turn, requires many changes in the professional composition and 
qualifications of planning units, reinforcing earlier propositions in 
this direction. 
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Proposition Eighteen: Political stability and containment of 
social violence are essential. This 
returns us to the necessity to take up 
planning improvement within a broad 
context of building up capacities to 
govern. 
51. This last proposition returns to the beginning, putting planning 
improvement within the broad context of the capacity to govern. Unless 
much political stability is assured and social violence is contained 
—planning for development is largely in vain. Therefore, when 
necessary, efforts should first concentrate on increasing political 
stability and reducing social violence. These two in turn depend in 
part on successful development, as much political instability and 
social violence stems from economic backwardness, disappointments of 
aspirations and subjective deprivation. Here, a difficult "catch" is 
faced: improvement of political stability and containment of social 
violence depends on successful development; but successful development 
depends in turn on existance of much political stability and on 
containment ot social violence. 
52. In situations where political instability and social violence 
inhibit development, upbuilding of political stability and containment 
of social violence should constitute primary goals for planning, 
introducing additional dimensions and needed qualifications. Also in 
many Latin American and Caribbean countries where politics at present 
is stable and social violence is very limited, their spectre should be 
kept in mind and their prevention must serve as an important con-
sideration in planning. This leads into important and sometimes 
crucial issues which require separate consideration. 
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Finale 
53. The eighteen propositions presented above, however rudimentary, 
hopefully serve their purpose of posing some of the main issues of 
"governability, participation and social aspects of planning". As 
explained in the preface, their presentation is brief and sharp, to 
keep this paper short and to stimulate discussion. Many of the issues 
will surely also be touched upon in the other subjects of the 
Colloquium and some are further detailed in the three appendixes. 
54. I hope to revise this paper and perhaps prepare it for wider 
distribution. Therefore, comments, critique and suggestions are all 
the more welcome by the author, both at the Colloquium and otherwise. 



